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October 8, 1992


Subject: EPA's Regulation of Commercial Hazardous Waste Incinerators

To; David Bussard

From: William Sanjour

Most hazardous waste incinerators in the United States are owned and operated by manufacturing companies for their own use. Of the 260 hazardous waste incinerators permitted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), only fifteen are commercial incinerators, i.e incinerators operated by a waste management company and available to anyone who can pay their price. Commercial incinerators handle only a minute fraction of the hazardous waste generated in this country. Nevertheless, they generate problems, violations, fines and news stories far out of proportion to their numbers and the percentage of wastes they handle. Nearby almost every commercial hazardous waste incinerator there has formed a grass-roots environmental group trying to close them down. The citizens complain of horrible odors, of high incidence of disease, of explosions and spills, and of the indifference state and federal environmental enforcement officials who tend to view the public as the enemy. The subject of this paper is EPA's regulation of these incinerators.

Commercial hazardous waste incinerators are extremely profitable, so much so that there is a frenzied rush to build new ones all over the country. This construction has been encouraged by EPA. The hazardous waste management industry usually seeks out poor rural areas with high unemployment rates for their facilities. However, because of the dreadful reputation of these incinerators, grass-root environmental movements have formed in communities to block new projects even at the hint of one trying to locate there. For the most part, the grass-roots opposition has been successful despite frequent vigorous promotion by federal and state officials.

All too frequently this promotion has had corrupt overtones. For example in Georgia, Governor Joe Frank Harris and his Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources, Leonard Ledbetter, pushed very hard to get a commercial hazardous waste incinerator located in Taylor County. When they left office in 1991, both Harris and Ledbetter took high paying jobs with a firm that wants to build the incinerator. In June of this year, a committee of the Georgia Hazardous Waste Management Authority found that the siting of a facility in Taylor County was based on politics rather than on environmental considerations and that the public in Taylor county had been intimidated and prevented from participating in the process. As a result, Governor Harris' decision to build an incinerator in Taylor County was overturned.(1)

Another example was the federal EPA issuing a permit for a commercial hazardous waste incinerator in East Liverpool, Ohio, in an already heavily polluted area surrounded by homes and schools and subject to frequent thermal inversions. (Behind the project is a consortium of investors put together by Arkansas billionaire Jackson Stephens, a golfing partner of Dan Quayle and contributor of hundreds of thousands of dollars to George Bush's presidential campaigns.) Local citizens found that the permit originally issued by EPA was full of irregularities and outright violations of the law.(2) Thus when the incinerator operator asked for a permit modification to install new equipment, EPA could have used the opportunity to re-issue the permit.

However, given the public mood, this was likely to result in long delays, if not revocation of the permit. The incinerator operator told the Ohio EPA that he couldn't "risk any appeals." The Ohio EPA agreed, saying that "if there is a way to authorize this change without a formal permit change, we should try to do so." EPA went along, and the EPA permitting official said in his agency's defense that EPA "had to treat our constituents [i.e. the incinerator operator] in a fair and equitable manner."(3)

The corruption involved in siting commercial hazardous waste facilities by the largest waste management firm, Waste Management Inc., was the subject of a recent report by the District Attorney of San Diego County, California.(4) The report says "[I]t is clear that Waste Management engages in practices designed to gain undue influence over government officials. ... These practices suggest an unseemly effort by Waste Management to manipulate local government for its own business ends. If unchecked, these practices, like other more direct forms of improper attempts to gain influence, may have a corrupting impact on local government and lead to decisions unsuitable to the best interests of the public." Furthermore, as shown in the East Liverpool, Ohio, case, state and federal officials can be corrupted as well.(5)

The history of EPA's regulation of hazardous waste incinerators does nothing to encourage anyone to want to live near one. In 1978, after considerable internal debate (more on this later), EPA decided to regulate hazardous waste incinerators through the use of operation standards alone. What this means is that certain operating parameters inside the facility are monitored, every fifteen minutes or so, often by computer. These parameters includes the furnace temperature, the rate at which the waste is fed into the furnace, the amount of carbon dioxide and oxygen in the stack (which indicates the efficiency of combustion), the electric current in the precipitator, etc. If any of these parameters exceeds the range specified in the permit, the computer makes a note of it. The facility is then supposed to shut down and correct the problem.

In addition, a chemical and physical analysis of the waste is supposed to be performed routinely in a manner specified in the permit to see that the waste does not contain materials not included in the permit. Records are supposed to be kept of this analysis and if discrepancies are found it must be noted and the waste returned to the generator.

The theory that EPA operates under is that if these rules are scrupulously followed, human health and the environment would be adequately protected. This theory has been seriously questioned, for example in the Greenpeace report Playing With Fire(6) which demonstrates that even if EPA's theoretical assumptions are all realized, there are still a great deal of toxic air emissions to be concerned about.

A second category of concern is whether it is technologically feasible to achieve the operating conditions that EPA postulates. For example, EPA scientists have recently admitted that modern hazardous waste incinerators simply cannot achieve the 99.99% DRE (destruction/removal efficiency) required by federal law.(7)

However, another issue which I would like to address at some length is; what are the prospects that these rules will be scrupulously followed or that if they aren't followed, EPA will take action? It should be obvious that with the rules set up by EPA it is rather easy to cheat. The operator of the incinerator produces and maintains most of the records which can show whether or not he is breaking the law. (This is analogous to writing our own W2 Forms and all the records that go with our income tax returns.) It is impossible for anyone outside the plant to check up on it. They may see dark plumes coming out of the stack, they may smell horrible odors which make them sick, their eyes may burn, there may be increases in respiratory diseases and cancer rates, the paint may peel from their houses, but none of that is a violation of the standards. For the most part, only the records kept by the operator or observations made by an EPA or state inspector can prove that the facility is in violation.

I've talked to many people who live near hazardous waste incinerators and I have reviewed many records and this is the way it really works. Inspectors typically work from nine to five Monday through Friday. So if the incinerator has anything particularly nasty to burn it will do so at night or on weekends. When the complaints come in to the inspector's office the next day, he will call the incinerator operator and ask him what's going on. He may also visit the plant, but rarely finds any violations. The enforcement officials tend to view the incinerator operator as their client and the public as a nuisance.

I have illustrated this in the chronology below from actual records of the Kentucky Division of Air Pollution Control for the LWD incinerator in Calvert City. These records were collected by Mrs. Corinne Whitehead of the Coalition for Health Concern.

May 30, 1986. Mrs. Bernett Dossett complained that "Company is burning something after 3 am which causes an odor like a skunk dipped in creosote and burned." The inspector states that since no dates were specified in the complaint, no action was taken.
June 2, 1986. The inspector wrote of the complaint from Mr. James Owen: "Odor was so bad on Saturday he could hardly breathe. He drove around and decided odor was coming from LWD. Mostly in morning but bad all day. He could not describe odor - just that it had a sickening smell." The inspector went out to LWD on June 16. Her report read: "Investigation of complaint about nauseating odor of 5-31-86. Both units were in operation on day of complaint. Record review showed operating temperatures for both units above the permitted limits. Operators log showed no special problems for that day. ... No strong odors were detected."
June 20, 1986. Mr. Owen again called to complain about smoke, odor, fumes, respiratory irritation, and reduced visibility from the night before. A scheduled inspection made at 1 pm found no serious problems.
June 24, 1986. Mr. Owen again complained about odors from LWD. When the inspector came down from Paducah he found no problem. Furthermore, he noted: "The plant has been inspected twice in the last week and further inspection would be considered harassment."
November 11, 1986. Once again Mr. Owen called about blue smoke and a sickening odor coming from LWD and once again the inspector found nothing.
February 13, 1987. Bob Ivey from the nearby B.F. Goodrich (BFG) plant called to complain about LWD. The report says: "He is president of the union at BFG and has received numerous complaints from employees at BFG about a sharp, burning odor from LWD which is causing eye & throat irritation. Mr. Ivey said it smells like an acid."
The inspector came at 4:15 pm and found no problem. He called Mr. Ivey at 4:55 pm and Mr. Ivey told him the odor had stopped at 4:00 pm.
April 16, 1987. Mr. Owen called again and again the inspector found nothing.
May 15, 1987. Mr. Owen called again. This time the inspector issued a notice of violation for excess opacity of the plume.
June 8, 1987. Mr. Owen called about odor and smoke from LWD the previous week. No action was taken.
August 31, 1987. Mr. Owen called about "bad odor from LWD today." The inspector's report states: "Today there was a phenolic type odor present on the gravel road east of the facility. No odor survey could be performed because of scentometer failure."
September 2, 1987. Sylvia Champion called about LWD. The report says: "Mrs. Champion is concerned about emissions from the accident which occurred recently. Was it only a brief flash fire or did it burn longer. She heard that ... people felt a burning sensation on their skin at the scene after the fire. Also she heard that the man who had been burned had walked through some material on the ground just 2 days before the incident and his boots had caught on fire."
The inspector talked to the plant manager, Mr. Trivedi. He told her there had been no fire or release of vapors and "Regarding workers boots catching on fire, Mr. Trivedi is aware of no such instance."
September 8, 1987. James Owen called 9:40 am and Ken Simmen called at 10:50 am to complain about a bad odor coming from LWD. The inspector showed up at 2:55 pm and found no significant problem. Furthermore, his report states: "No odor survey was possible using a scentometer because the winds were shifting and the odor from all the plants in Calvert City are mixing together."
November 7. 1987. Don Siebert, Charlie Doom and James Champion called the inspector at home on Saturday morning to complain about the haze with "a very unusual odor" over the valley. She arrived at the site at 12:20 pm and found nothing of significance.
In these two years covered, despite numerous complaints, only one Notice of Violation was issued. Notice that in every instance the inspector accepts the plant manager's word without question but any claims by the public have to be proven or personally verified by the inspector. The situation for the people living near the incinerator has not improved over the years and is even worse today.

Despite widespread violations, it is rare for an enforcement agency to issue a formal Notice of Violation and the consequence of issuing one is usually nothing more than a promise by the operator not to do it again. EPA's cumbersome enforcement procedure, is illustrated in the flow chart in Figure 1. The system provides numerous avenues for the operator to delay, procrastinate, negotiate, adjudicate and appeal for years and years while he keeps on operating. Looking at this chart, it is easy to understand why there is so little interest on the part of enforcement officials for going through this maze.

EPA assures the public that an incinerator will be shut down if it deviates from the operating conditions specified in the permit. For example, in an EPA document meant to provide "answers to questions that citizens may have about hazardous waste incineration"(8) we find the following:

During operations, the permit requires continuous monitoring of certain parameters (for example, combustion temperature) to ensure that they are within the ranges specified by the permit. If parameters deviate from these ranges, a sensor will trigger the automatic waste feed shut-off system which is required in all permitted incinerators. The waste feed will not resume until the required operating conditions have been restored.
In real life the situation is very different. If serious violations are found it does not follow that the incinerator will be shut down or that the violations will even be quickly corrected. This is true even if the violations are causing an increase in the risk to the health of the people living nearby.

Take, for example, the hazardous waste facility in Sauget, Illinois, owned by CWM (Chemical Waste Management Inc.), the hazardous waste subsidiary of WMI (Waste Management Inc). CWM bought the facility, known as Trade Winds Incineration in 1983. It had three hazardous waste incinerators at the time and CWM added a fourth "state of the art" incinerator in 1989. This facility, located in southern Illinois, accepts hazardous waste from all over the country including wastes from as far away as Puerto Rico, British Columbia and Tijuana. Sauget (which before 1967 was called Monsanto) is located just two miles from East St. Louis, Illinois and St. Louis, Missouri whch have a combined population of about a half million people.

In January 1990 an explosion in a holding tank caused the state and federal EPA to take a close look at the Sauget facility. Among the deficiencies that they found was the fact that the new number 4 incinerator was operating at a temperature considerably below the temperature at which it was required to operate. This meant that the DRE was considerably below the much touted level of 99.99 percent. As a result, toxic pollutants were being emitted into the air at a much greater rate than legally permitted. Nevertheless, state and federal authorities have been trading communications for two and a half years without correcting the problem while the people of Sauget continued to be exposed to these illegal emissions. The following is a chronology of correspondence from EPA to the facility(9).

January 1990. An explosion in a holding tank alarms the state and federal EPA and causes them to take a close look at the Sauget facility.
September 28, 1990. A letter from EPA informs CWM of numerous violations which might lead EPA to stop shipping Superfund wastes to its Sauget incinerator. Among the violations is the fact that CWM has not made a chemical and physical analysis of the waste before burning it and that "incinerator No. 4 has been operating 300 degrees F below the permit required kiln temperature since January 1990." Thus the public had been exposed to illegal toxic emissions for at least eight months with the full knowledge of federal and state EPAs.
December 7, 1990. Another letter from EPA informs CWM that they have not corrected the problems pointed out in the September 28th letter. Meanwhile EPA continues to ship Superfund wastes to the facility and the public continues to be exposed to the illegal toxic emissions.

December 28, 1990. A letter is sent to CWM stating that "the U.S. EPA had made a final determination of unacceptability concerning Incinerator #4". The letter also says that EPA urges CWM to enter a consent agreement with EPA and the State of Illinois to resolve all of the violations. Presumably EPA stopped shipping Superfund wastes to Incinerator No. 4 at that point but other hazardous wastes continue going there and the public continues to be exposed to the illegal toxic emissions(10).

January 28, 1991. EPA sends a letter to CWM informing them of a new set of violations which would further threaten their ability to accept Superfund wastes in the future. Meanwhile the public continues to be exposed to the illegal toxic emissions from Incinerator No. 4.

February 4, 1991. Another letter from EPA informs CWM that they have not resolved the issues raised in the letter of September 28, 1990. Meanwhile the public continues to be exposed to the illegal toxic emissions.

April 11, 1991. EPA informs CWM that since the issues raised in the letters of September 28, 1990 and January 28, 1991 have not been resolved, Superfund wastes will not be sent to Incinerators No. 1, 2, or 3. Meanwhile the public continues to be exposed to the illegal toxic emissions from non-Superfund hazardous waste.

August 13, 1991. Additional violations cause EPA to issue another order banning Superfund wastes (which were already banned) to the Sauget facility, but other hazardous wastes continue to be burned under conditions which violate their permit and expose the public to the illegal toxic emissions.

December 23, 1991. CWM signs a consent agreement with the State of Illinois and, without admitting guilt, agrees to pay a civil penalty of $1.9 million. The agreement stipulates, among other things, that Incinerator No. 1 (which had been burning hazardous wastes for over a decade) is unfit for burning hazardous waste and must be replaced or upgraded. In addition, Incinerator No. 4, which had been operating at 300 degrees below its permitted temperature, must undergo a new series of test burns to demonstrate that it can operate under the required conditions. This process could take six months to a year; meanwhile the incinerator would continue to operate and expose the public to the illegal toxic emissions.

December 24, 1991. Additional violations cause EPA to issue still another order banning Superfund wastes to the Sauget facility, but other hazardous wastes continue to be burned under conditions which violate their permit and expose the public to the illegal toxic emissions.

July 2, 1992. As of this date the test burns required in the consent agreement have not been carried out,(11) and the facility is still in violation of its permit and the public continues to be exposed to illegal toxic emissions.

A common violation, which is almost unenforceable, is the failure to perform a chemical and physical analysis of the waste before throwing it in the furnace. Incinerator permits are issued for specific wastes only; however incinerator operators frequently take the waste generator's word for what's in the waste. Keep in mind that hazardous waste is a factory's garbage. If they typically ship out say a thousand gallons a month of waste solvents and they find themselves with say fifty gallons of waste PCB which they don't know what to do with, what is more natural than dumping it in with the waste solvent to be hauled away to the incinerator? No one would be the wiser. If the incinerator is not permitted to burn PCBs it means it was not designed to destroy PCBs, therefore the community would be exposed to illegal toxic emissions.

This problem is very common. For example in Kentucky, Don Harker, former head of the state's waste management division, was fired because he tried to revoke the permit of the previously mentioned LWD incinerator at Calvert City. He said of LWD, "I don't know what LWD has burned. I don't think LWD knows what it has burned. I don't think anyone does."(12) In the inspection reports I reviewed from LWD, time after time, when there were complaints about horrible odors, the inspector took the operator's word for what was burned. Yet the operator himself doesn't know what he is burning and doesn't even have the laboratory equipment or technical staff to find out.

Every now and then a commercial hazardous waste incinerator explodes. This happened in February 1991 to an incinerator operated by Chemical Waste Management Inc. (CWM) in Chicago. This can only happen if the waste is not analyzed. CWM was fined $3.75 million for violations at their Chicago incinerator which included the failure to keep records on what was being burned. An Illinois EPA spokesperson said: "It turned out that they didn't really have a good idea of what all they had there. It was woefully inadequate."(13) Yet these inadequacies were not discovered until the incinerator blew up. Years of routine inspections by state and federal officials had failed to uncover them.

Not all illegal wastes burned in incinerators are the result of a lack of attention on the part of the incinerator operator. In some cases the operator will turn a blind eye and accept wastes he is not permitted to accept if he knows it cannot harm his incinerator, regardless of the affect it may have on the community. For example low level radioactive wastes from nuclear weapons plants have been sent by DOE (Department of Energy) contractors to commercial hazardous waste incinerators and landfills all over the country(14) even though these facilities are not permitted to accept radioactive waste. The biggest recipients were the CWM landfill in Emelle, Alabama, the ENSCO incinerator in El Dorado, Arkansas, and the Rollins incinerator in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.(15) DOE contractor, Martin Marietta, not only knew that the wastes were radioactive but took pains to eradicate that fact from the shipping papers. This practice had been going on for six years before it was discovered in 1991.

In 1990, a special joint task force of the U.S. EPA and the U.S. OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) conducted 62 unannounced inspections of 20 hazardous waste incinerators.(16) They found 75 violations of EPA regulations including numerous instances where automatic safety devices had been bypassed, allowing toxic emissions to escape into the atmosphere. Bear in mind that these violations were found in the incinerator operator's own records. These facilities are inspected many times a year by state and federal EPA inspectors who are supposed to review those records. Yet at 20 facilities the task force was able to find 75 serious violations which were not reported by the routine inspectors.

Why is the quality of inspection so bad? Inspectors are typically poorly trained. They have low morale and high turnover. EPA statistics show that 41% of RCRA inspectors have conducted ten or fewer inspections.(17) There is no reward to inspectors for finding serious violations and indeed, zealous inspectors are typically given a hard time by their supervisors. Thus, they end up as "bean counters" while they look for other work. One of the best places for enforcement officials to find good paying job opportunities is with the facilities they regulate. It is common to find former state and federal enforcement officials working for hazardous waste facility operators. The hazardous waste management industry abounds with conflicts of interest with their government regulators.(18)

What can be done to protect the public from the toxic emissions from these incinerators? I have been in the regulatory business a long time and I have always felt that regulators work best when they are closely watched by the people they are supposed to be protecting. But in the case of EPA's hazardous incinerator regulations, there is no way for the public to check on the regulators or regulatees. To a large extent, EPA rules are a lot like the constitution of the former Soviet Union, lots of beautiful phrases with promises of all kinds of protection which somehow never seem to happen.

I was chief of the Hazardous Waste Technology and Assessment Branch from 1974 to 1978. After the passage of RCRA by Congress in 1976, I was given responsibility for drafting regulations for hazardous waste facilities, including incinerators. I believed that there had to be ways for the people living near hazardous waste facilities to determine for themselves, if necessary, whether their health was being threatened by the facilities and that they should not be wholly dependent on regulatory agencies to make that determination for them. I therefore pushed very hard to have some sort of ambient air standard for toxic gases as well as an odor standard.

Starting shortly after the passage of RCRA in 1976 until September of 1978, an internal battle was waged over the use of odor and ambient air standards. The opposition was led by EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS), headed by Walter Barber, which has the responsibility for writing regulations for toxic and hazardous air emissions.

The odor standards were the first to go. A memo from one of my subordinates in January 1977 reports:

EPA did propose odor regulations but the upper management vetoed them on the basis that odors are considered to be a local problem. OAQPS did not believe that a correlation had been established between odors and health effects.(19)
The reason for this opposition was, first and foremost, the fact that EPA had been given the responsibility under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to develop regulations for hazardous air pollutants but, with a few exceptions, had failed to do so. At the time there were hazardous pollutant standards only for asbestos, beryllium, mercury, vinyl chloride and lead, hardly enough to protect public health from the thousands of toxic chemicals emitted by a hazardous waste incinerator.

EPA had the authority under RCRA to develop air standards for hazardous waste facilities and the mandate to write standards adequate to protect human health and the environment. There is a provision in RCRA which says that if other acts of Congress (such as the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act) adequately regulate some aspects of the facility, then they should take precedence over RCRA. However OAQPS turned this reasoning on its head, saying that since EPA has not issued regulations for toxic air pollutants (including standards for hazardous waste facilities) under CAA it should not do so under RCRA.

Another reason for opposing ambient air standards, which has some merit, was that if there were other sources of pollution in the area you could not distinguish between them. However, I felt that this was not sufficient reason for dispensing with ambient standards and, furthermore, it could have the positive benefit of discouraging construction of incinerators in areas which are already heavily polluted.

The argument was used that we would have to continuously monitor the air for several hundred pollutants and that this was too costly and impractical. This was a specious argument as we were only proposing to monitor the pollutant on an as-needed basis. This is no different from OSHA's enforcement of ambient air standards or from the enforcement of highway speed limits, for that matter.

In the absence of standards developed by OAQPS we had proposed basing ambient air standards on those developed by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) for worker safety and replacing them with OAQPS standards as they become available. There were several hundred of these standards. However, this would have been very embarrassing to the agency as it would have highlighted its shortcomings in implementing the Clean Air Act.

In another 1977 memo, a representative of OAQPS derisively refers to our proposed standards as "pseudo air standards," saying:

Establishment of pseudo air standards would cause confusion with regard to non-waste related air quality goals and be a dangerous precedent.(20)
In November my boss wrote to his boss:
Only five hazardous air pollutants have been identified under the Clean Air Act. We feel that the number is inadequate for hazardous waste facility emission standards and have proposed adding [approximately] 200 OSHA standards. OAQPS doesn't want us to do that. A crunch may come soon.(21)
In an April 1978, meeting OAQPS warns once again of the potential embarrassment to the agency if hazardous air standards are set (by our office) for hazardous waste facilities but not (by OAQPS) for the much larger number of factories which emit toxic fumes. One OAQPS representative says:
...establishing a limit for emissions from a hazardous waste facility only, sets a dangerous precedent if it is not done for chemical plants.
And in the same meeting, his boss, Walt Barber, warned that:
...the greatest conflict will arise when EPA sanctions two approaches to establishing ambient air goals.(22)
The crunch my boss had predicted came in September when he informed me that our own assistant administrator, Tom Jorling, who had previously favored the ambient air standards for hazardous waste facilities, turned around and killed them.(23) He also butchered most of the other regulations we had been working on.(24) I did not accept this gracefully and a few days later I was transferred.(25) Thus began my career as a whistleblower.

In 1978 OAQPS had written only five hazardous air pollutant standards. By 1990 the number was up to eight. Congress, in its frustration with EPA's pace, removed the responsibility from EPA and defined 189 hazardous air pollutants in the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990. Congress then gave EPA ten years to issue emission standards for industries emitting these pollutants, including hazardous waste incinerators. However, hazardous waste incinerators are at the bottom of EPA's priority list and considering EPA's track record it is doubtful that this deadline will be met in twenty years.

In closing, there are several ironies (which may not be appreciated by people living near hazardous waste incinerators) that followed from all this:

In spite of the fact that OAQPS insisted that it is impossible to develop ambient air standards to protect the general public, the workers inside a hazardous waste incinerator facility are protected by ambient air standards from OSHA.


1. Ken Edelstein, "Incinerator Foes Taste Victory," Columbus Ledger-Inquirer, Columbus, Georgia, June 16, 1992.

2. Peter Montague and William Sanjour, "The Breakdown of Moral ity," Rachel's Hazardous Waste News #287 (May 27, 1992). Copies are available from the Environmental Research Foundation, P.O. Box 73700, Washington, DC 20056-3700.

3. Michael D. Stein, Tri-State Environmental Council, November 16, 1991. Copies available for a $5 contribution to: SOS, 23 Forest Hills, Wheeling, WV 26003.

4. 4. Peter Montague, "The San Diego Report," Rachel's Hazardous Waste News #299 (August 19, 1992). Copies are available from the Environmental Research Foundation, P.O. Box 73700, Washington, DC 20056-3700.4.

5. See also: William Sanjour, "Why EPA Is Like It Is And What Can Be Done About It," Environmental Research Foundation, February, 1992. Copies are available from the Environmental Research Foundation, P.O. Box 73700, Washington, DC 20056-3700.

6. Pat Costner and Joe Thornton, "Playing With Fire", Greenpeace, Washington, DC, 1990. Copies available from: Greenpeace Public Information Office, 1436 U St. NW, Washington, DC 20009, (202) 319- 2444.

7. Peter Montague, "All Hazardous Waste Incinerators Fail to Meet EPA Regulations, EPA says,"Rachel's Hazardous Waste News #280 (April 7, 1992). Copies are available from the Environmental Research Foundation, P.O. Box 73700, Washington, DC 20056-3700.

8. "Hazardous Waste Incineration: Questions and Answers," U.S Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, (EPA/530-SW-88-018), Washington, DC, 20460, April, 1988.

9. This chronology is based on correspondence between David A. Ullrich, Director of the Waste Management Division in the U.S. EPA's Region 5 office in Chicago to Chemical Waste Management, Trade Winds Incineration Division, Sauget, Illinois.

10. In 1985, while on detail to the Congressional Office of Technology Assesment, I did some research which showed that clean-up wastes from Superfund sites were frequently being shipped to EPA permitted RCRA facilities which were as bad or worse than the Superfund sites. I did this in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of EPA's RCRA regulations. EPA's reaction, however, was not to improve RCRA, but to ban the shipment of Superfund wastes to inadequate RCRA facilities.

11. Private communication with Bill Ingersol, an attorney with the Illinois EPA, July 2, 1992.

12. Private communication with Don Harker.

13. Peter Shinkle, "Nuclear Plants Sent Waste to Sites Across the Land," Baton Rouge State Times (August 14, 1991), p.1.

14. Shinkle, op. cit.

15. Testimony of Leo P. Duffy, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Energy before the Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, February 20, 1992.

16. Peter Montague, "Study of Hazardous Waste Incinerators Reveals 'Widespread Deficiencies'-EPA, "Rachel's Hazardous Waste News #237 (June 12, 1991). Copies are available from the Environmental Research Foundation, P.O. Box 73700, Washington, DC 20056-3700.

17. The Nations Hazardous Waste Management Program at a Crossroad The RCRA Implementation Study," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, (EPA/530-SW-90-069), Washington, DC, July, 1990.

18. William Sanjour, "Why EPA Is Like It Is And What Can Be Done About It," Environmental Research Foundation, February, 1992. Copies are available from the Environmental Research Foundation, P.O. Box 73700, Washington, DC 20056-3700.

19. Memorandum from John Schaum to The Record dated January 18, 1977 included in a letter from William Sanjour to Terri Swearingen dated March 20, 1992, hereafter called Terri 92.

20. Memorandum from George Walsh, OAQPS to William Sanjour, dated September 22, 1977. Included in Terri 92.

21. Memorandum from John Lehman to Steffan Plehn dated November 18, 1977. Included in Terri 92.

22. Memorandum from Timothy Fields to William Sanjour dated May 8, 1978. Included in Terri 92.

23. Memorandum from John Lehman to Steffen Plehn dated September 5, 1978. Included in Terri 92. The stated reason for Jorling's decision was that the "air modelling techniques are not sufficiently developed to be legally defensible." However, our proposed rule did not require air modeling. It only came into play when a facility operator wanted to apply for a variance from using the best available technology. Furthermore, air models are used in rulemaking throughout EPA.

24. See my testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Committee on Governmental Affairs, August 1, 1979.

25. I filed a grievance protesting the transfer and an EPA grievance examiner found that the transfer was illegal.

26. 46 FR 11126. This proposed 1981 land disposal regulation was rather remarkable in several respects. First because it contained ambient air monitoring standards applicable to all hazardous waste facilities and second, because it admitted that EPA did not know how to construct a landfill that worked and left it to the prospective operator to prove to EPA that he could do so. Needless to say, industry hated the proposed rule and it was never finalized.

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